On February 1, 1942, General Obata gathered the group commanders at Bangkok and ordered them to strike the Allied airfields at Rangoon and Toungoo around the clock--fighters by day, bombers by night. Meanwhile, he dispatched 450 men of the 15th Airport Group to the newly captured British airfields at Moulmein, to rebuild them for use by the JAAF. Eighty men from the 50th Sentai also joined this project, which would cut the distance to Rangoon by more than half. However, road conditions were so bad that actual reconstruction did not begin until the middle of the month.

The Japanese recorded 17 separate attacks against Rangoon and Toungoo airfields in a three-day period, involving 120 fighter sorties, 80 light and medium bomber sorties, and 20 heavy bomber sorties. Two fighter planess were lost over Mingaladon, but there is no detail of these combats. On the evening of Feb. 4, a reconnaisance of the Allied airfields showed disappointing results, with 50 "small planes" (presumably fighters) and 10 large ones (presumably bombers) still available to support the British army. For all the sacrifices of the past month, therefore, the enemy air force in Burma appeared to be larger than ever.

Obata therefore ordered a change in plan, with the Japanese air force concentrating on ground targets at the front, to enable the army to cross the Salween and Sittang rivers into Burma proper. Allied morale was judged to be very high, causing the Japanese advance to slow down.

On February 6, attacks resumed against Mingaladon, with a 77th Sentai fighter lost and another missing (but evidently landed at Moulmein and returned to base next day). The Japanese fighters claimed five planes shot down, though the Allies suffered no losses that day; for their part, the AVG was claiming six Japanese fighters and a bomber.

The 47th Independent Chutai of Type 2 fighters (Nakajima Ki-44 "Shoki" or "Tojo") was added to Obata's fighter force. When they arrived mid-month, however, there were only three fighters in the squadron, with two more having been left behind in Bangkok for repairs. The 62nd Sentai heavy bomber group, which had borne so much of the fighting over Rangoon, meanwhile moved to Saigon to refit with new aircraft.

Once again Obata announced a new plan: the JAAF would attack the north Burma railroad centers of Mandalay and Bassein, which he had evidently decided were the source of Allied reinforcements. Then they would again concentrate on the Rangoon area. In other developments, Japanese construction crews at Moulmein airport were attacked, with several ground personnel killed and wounded. Further personnel arrived and began to reconstruct the airport and set up a communications system at Moulmein.

Meanwhile, reconnaissance showed 3 large, 4 medium, and 17 small planes at Mingaladon airport, plus 7 large and 6 small planes at Hlegu (known to the Allies as Highland Queen). On February 19, the Ki-27 fighters of the 77th Sentai and the Ki-30 light bombers of the 31st Sentai attacked Pyinmana on the railroad line north of Toungoo. Returning, the light bombers went off course as a result of fog (haze?) and strong winds, with one Ki-30 lost and three more damaged in crash landings near Lampang. Meanwhile, the 50th Sentai escorted the 14th Sentai heavy bombers to Mandalay, where they bombed military barracks. One bomber crashed on returning. On the same day, the army crossed the river at Bilin and stalled on the west bank. The ground commanders asked Obata for help, so the north Burma campaign was called off.

On February 21, Obata told the 31st and 77th sentais to continue working with the army, while the 8th and 50th sentais resumed their north-Burma campaign. Over the Sittang River, the 77th fighters met six Tomahawks, claiming one certain and two probable, while the AVG pilots claimed four Nates shot down. (In fact, there were no losses on either side.)

The Japanese accounts of this period place great emphasis on the Allied ground-cooperation units--both 1 Squadron IAF and 28 Squadron RAF--as "really dangerous" to the ground forces. Equipped with slow, high-wing Westland Lysanders (and often escorted by the Brewster Buffaloes of 67 Squadron), these units are usually relegated to a footnote in the Burma campaign.

On February 23, Capt. Ohira of the 70th Independent Chutai reconnaissance unit was shot down and killed while observing a battle at the Sittang river. Evidently his antagonist was Squadron Leader Barry Sutton of 135 Squadron.

Looking back on the campaign so far, the commander of the 77th Sentai reported that although the Type 97 fighter had high speed in combat, the enemy fighters were able to take advantage of their higher overall speed to attack from above, then leave, to the disadvantage of the Japanese fighters. "One cannot count the number of fighters," he declared. "Numbers are not important--technique is important." The 77th Sentai by now had lost 25 fighter planes and 14 of its best pilots (including one captured and one badly wounded) in the Burma campaign. The Japanese fighter pilots were "fighting heartily" and had done very well.

For its part, the 50th Sentai had lost 20 aircraft in the Burma campaign.

The Japanese commanders noted that their losses were particularly high in ground attack missions. Proportionately, their losses were much higher than those suffered by Allied pilots. They also noted that the Japanese forces tended to exhaust their fuel and ordnance supplies, and that they should emulate the Allies' "very professional" standard of training.

As of February 25, the Japanese fighter forces consisted of the 77th Sentai with 23 planes, the 50th Sentai with 21 planes, and the newly arrived 47th Indepdent Chutai with 3 of the new Nakajima Type 2 "Shoki" fighters.

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